I’m not sure, but I’m told some famous guy back in Biblical liturgy was once asked to explain the point of the Pentateuch (aka, the Torah, aka, The Five Books of Moses) while "standing on one leg".  

I now undertake a task, possibly no less daunting, regarding CMMI.  And, if there ever were anyone more appropriate to try it, I doubt I’ve met them.

Seriously though, much has been written here and many other places (not to mention eons of conference and user group content) about a number of "universal truths" about CMMI.  Let’s get these out there first, but without dwelling on them:

• There are no "processes" in CMMI, only practices, and there’s a difference.
• The practices in CMMI are "what" but not "how".
• These practices are use to improve your processes, not to define them.
• The CMMI does not require the SCAMPI appraisal to be effective.  You can use CMMI to improve your operation without ever using the SCAMPI to appraise your use of CMMI.
• 42.  OK.  Not really.

However, not a single one of these "truths" explain the point of CMMI, or,  how to actually use CMMI.  So, here it goes:

Each one of the practices in CMMI improves some aspect of your organization’s performance resulting from how you do your work.  It doesn’t matter whether it’s providing a service or developing a product.  And, it doesn’t matter whether you do so using so-called traditional development methods or Agile approaches.  If you have performance issues in an area of your operation (called, "Process Areas" in CMMI), Check each of the practices in that area for activities in your operation that might be causing those performance issues. 

It’s assumed, then, if you don’t have any issues covered by a practice then you don’t need to do anything about a practice, because you’re already doing it.  This says nothing of how well you do it, why you do it, how you do it, whether you recognize that you do it, or whether the fact that you do it is a complete coincidental freak of nature, but, if you read a practice, understand the risk it avoids, and you don’t encounter that risk, you’re somehow performing that practice.  Pretty simple.

I’ll repeat and summarize that two-step thought experiment:

1. Look in the process areas for practices that address performance issues you’re experiencing with the operation of your work.  When you encounter a practice (or more than one), the absence of which can explain why you’re seeing those issues, make appropriate changes to your operation so that you incorporate that/those practice(s) into your operation.  Rinse and repeat.
2. Practices that don’t represent risks or issues you’re not seeing are (pretty much, by definition) practices you’re somehow managing to accomplish.  Don’t bother with them — unless you notice that you don’t like something about how you do it, but that’s a different priority/matter.

Keep in mind, this says nothing of

• whether what you do/don’t do will suffice as "evidence" for an appraisal
• how well you perform the practices (regardless of whether or not you perform them or believe you can use them to improve),
• what it takes to incorporate practices or make change, in general, happen in your operation,
• whether an appraisal team will concur with whether you do/don’t perform practices, or
• you interpret practices in constructive ways.

Nonetheless, if you internalize the significance of the above 2 steps, you can (I dare say, "will") save yourselves a lot of time and grief when using CMMI.  This approach can certainly help you prioritize the practices for which to focus on, appraisal or not.  And, if you do take this approach towards preparation for an appraisal, keep in mind the bulleted caveats and don’t try this alone.

Call for papers to the Cutter IT Journal for which I’m the edition’s guest editor.

Topic: Agile and CMMI: Why Isn’t this Conversation Dead Yet?

Proposals/abstracts due 17 August 2012, so act quickly!

See Cutter’s blog and web site for more information, including specific areas of interest, editorial guidelines and how to submit your proposal/abstract.

(If you reference CMMI experience, please ensure that your experience with CMMI is from using v1.2 or later.)

OK, OK, so it’s Mothers’ Day in the US… but we all miss out on family matters all the time for things far less awesome than this.

Lean Camp New England is a one day open space event led by Jim Benson, author of Personal Kanban. It is an opportunity to share and learn about Lean and Kanban in software development, IT operations and services, and other knowledge work fields.

Lean Camp New England is an all day event at the World Trade Center Boston, on May 13th (Sunday).
Registration is open now at a cost of $300 – catering is included.
Register at http://lssc12.leanssc.org/.

Boston is the center of gravity for lean thinking in the US. However, much of that thinking has been in fields outside of IT and Software and Systems Engineering/Development.

If you live in New England, or people you know live in New England, and are interested in getting up-to-speed among the leading thinkers and practitioners in Lean in IT and Software and Systems Engineering/Development, I highly encourage you and them to register for Lean Camp New England.

This is a rare opportunity to enjoy a regional 1-day open space / unconference in conjunction with a large international conference, Lean Software & Systems 2012 – as a result a significant number of international experts will be present and participating.

Where else can you get direct coaching from the experts for only $300?

Want fast, easy CMMI ratings?  Even high maturity?

First, implement lean, Goldratt’s TOC, Deming’s ideas, Kanban, and other related concepts, then get busy with CMMI.

What you may not know is that lean is easier, faster, and generates better performance results sooner than CMMI.

Lean improves delivery issues sooner than process improvement alone.  Improved deliveries improves revenues, stabilizes cash flow, increases margin, makes customers happier and results in more sales.

In other words, lean means better flow and better flow means better business.

CMMI is great, but is often attempted as a first line of offense to issues it’s not meant to deal with.  CMMI is meant to improve flow, not define it, and, lean helps define flow.
(Yes, I know I said "theory of constraints" twice.)

Assuming there are unfulfilled orders in the sales pipeline, lack of revenue is due to lack of flow.  Typically, this is due more to what’s in the flow, how much is in it, and the clarity and cleanliness of how the operation’s flow is aligned.  Using CMMI to "fix" issues with flow is like using the Brownian motion of steeping tea to power a random-number generator.  It’s just too much too soon.  Process issues are themselves symptoms of flow issues.

Deal with the symptoms first.  Then, tackle the processes.

Two events to put on your radar:

Lean Software and Systems Conference: Boston, 13-18 May (Lean Camp & Lean Action Kitchen, Sunday, Conference Monday-Wednesday, and Tutorials Thursday & Friday).  I’m helping to organize and speaking at the conference, and running a tutorial on this topic on Thursday.

Kanban Change Agent Masterclass: Miami, 23-25 May.  I’ll be participating as a special guest to demonstrate how Kanban helps achieve CMMI ratings, including High Maturity.

For more than the last 10 years I’ve been thinking a lot about CMMI.  Many of these thoughts have been ruminating on the ideas of how to incorporate CMMI in ways that add value, demonstrate effectiveness, and don’t disrupt the operation.  I’ve even opined much in this blog (in too many ways) on the need to know what your processes are before you can use CMMI to improve them, and that for many operations, CMMI isn’t even appropriate.

A few recent discussions and experiences put a particularly fine point on the extent to which CMMI is really the ‘cart before the horse’ when applied within an operation that has yet to clearly discern its process, and here’s why:

Most operations I’ve encountered are not ready to use CMMI because they are unclear on exactly how they make money.

Obviously, I’m not talking about the accounting process of billing out invoices and depositing checks.  And, I’m not even talking about the voodoo around figuring out how to ensure that internal costs (salaries, equipment, etc.) are less than what they charge clients for the work they do.

So, I must be talking about something more subtle.  I wish I were.  And, this is what’s both frightening and sad.  I’m merely talking about the relationship between capacity and demand.  For that matter, I’m not even worried much about demand, which is another matter.  I’m mostly talking about capacity.

What is capacity?

According to some, capacity is a measure of volume of work.  Throughput, for instance.  According to others, it’s the wherewithal to do the work.  Either way, too many operations don’t know what their capacity is. 

What does it actually take to get work done?  And, along with that, can it be reasonably expected of the operation to reliably and predictably continue to run how it runs (not knowing exactly how it runs) and to have any right to greater-than-zero confidence that they will continue to run as it does?

For one thing, many operations run outside of reasonable tolerances. In particular, people put in many many hours of unpaid over-time [in the US this is common for salaried employees].  This is an "out-of-tolerance" condition.  It is unreasonable to expect an operation’s greatest source of working knowledge to continue to work nights and weekends.  Furthermore, it is risky to do so.  One client said he couldn’t be away from the office for 5 minutes before product would stop shipping.  Eventually he will get married or his wife will have a child, or, heaven-forbid, he may take vacation! 

What’s worse is the extra time he and his team put in is entirely unaccounted-for.  His employer merely estimates, contracts, and bills enough to cover his and the team’s salaries, not what it actually takes to get work done.

Another reason true capacity is obscured is because more work going into the operation than there’s product (or services) coming out.  The most common cause of this is the misperception that work started = work completed, but this is an incomplete equation.  But a better equation to work with is work worked-on = work completed.  The key mistakes is the assumption that started = in-work.  That’s true for maybe 50% of the actual started work (often less).

This next reason for the lack of insight into true capacity (or capability, really) is that so many operations don’t account (either in their estimates — which sort-of makes sense — or in their capture of time-spent — which is unforgivable) for the time to correct defects, time to perform rework, time for paying-down technical debt, or time and effort to tracking-down the causes of defects and rework to avoid defects, rework, and technical debt in the first place!

I’ll end with one of the toughest, most sensitive observations of the last few months.  Some of my best clients (from the perspective of having their act together) have strong confidence in functional competence and, admittedly, weaker confidence in their programmatic credibility.  And, to put it plainly, by "programmatic" I mean their ability to have the same confidence in the rationale for their estimates and plans as they have in their ability to produce what their clients want. 

In these operations, I’ve found fundamental disconnects between how work is estimated and why clients should trust the technical competence of the operation.  In other words, they build trust with their prospects and clients on their ability to do the work and build the products, but in order to get the work in the first place they have to use a lot of hand-waving and breath-holding when it comes to their estimates.

A more-or-less summary way to describe all of this is as follows:

Most operations have Built a way of working that they’ve managed to Capitalize.  Over time, they’ve found that their Build*Capitalize approach is tough to Sustain.  Try that they might, whether it’s CMMI or something else, they’re looking to "fix" the equation on the "Sustain" side.  The problem is that CMMI *does* operate on the Sustain side, but the problems with the operation aren’t in the "Sustain", it’s that their approach to Capitalizing on what they Built is no longer Sustainable.  What needs to change is on the Build side.  Occasionally, there’s a need to revisit the Capitalize component, but most often it’s the Build that needs refactoring.

Hence, applying CMMI to an operation whose "build" is broken is putting the cart before the horse.  While it’s possible to build CMMI practices into the operation’s way of working, this is an activity of the "build" side of the equation, the sort I noted above contrasting from applying CMMI to the sustain side.  If CMMI is to be truly about improving the processes of the operation in a "sustaining" sort of way, and not defining them, the operation must understand what’s going on, and that means it must know its capacity.  Because unless it knows its capacity, it doesn’t really know what’s going on.

For more than the last 10 years I’ve been thinking a lot about CMMI. Many of these thoughts have been ruminating on the ideas of how to incorporate CMMI in ways that add value, demonstrate effectiveness, and don’t disrupt the operation. I’ve even opined much in this blog (in too many ways) on the need to know what your processes are before you can use CMMI to improve them, and that for many operations, CMMI isn’t even appropriate.

A few recent discussions and experiences put a particularly fine point on the extent to which CMMI is really the ‘cart before the horse’ when applied within an operation that has yet to clearly discern its process, and here’s why:

Most operations I’ve encountered are not ready to use CMMI because they are unclear on exactly how they make money.

Obviously, I’m not talking about the accounting process of billing out invoices and depositing checks. And, I’m not even talking about the voodoo around figuring out how to ensure that internal costs (salaries, equipment, etc.) are less than what they charge clients for the work they do.

So, I must be talking about something more subtle. I wish I were. And, this is what’s both frightening and sad. I’m merely talking about the relationship between capacity and demand. For that matter, I’m not even worried much about demand, which is another matter. I’m mostly talking about capacity.

What is capacity?

According to some, capacity is a measure of volume of work. Throughput, for instance. According to others, it’s the wherewithal to do the work. Either way, too many operations don’t know what their capacity is.

What does it actually take to get work done? And, along with that, can it be reasonably expected of the operation to reliably and predictably continue to run how it runs (not knowing exactly how it runs) and to have any right to greater-than-zero confidence that they will continue to run as it does?

For one thing, many operations run outside of reasonable tolerances. In particular, people put in many many hours of unpaid over-time [in the US this is common for salaried employees]. This is an “out-of-tolerance” condition. It is unreasonable to expect an operation’s greatest source of working knowledge to continue to work nights and weekends. Furthermore, it is risky to do so. One client said he couldn’t be away from the office for 5 minutes before product would stop shipping. Eventually he will get married or his wife will have a child, or, heaven-forbid, he may take vacation!

What’s worse is the extra time he and his team put in is entirely unaccounted-for. His employer merely estimates, contracts, and bills enough to cover his and the team’s salaries, not what it actually takes to get work done.

Another reason true capacity is obscured is because more work going into the operation than there’s product (or services) coming out. The most common cause of this is the misperception that work started = work completed, but this is an incomplete equation. But a better equation to work with is work worked-on = work completed. The key mistakes is the assumption that started = in-work. That’s true for maybe 50% of the actual started work (often less).

This next reason for the lack of insight into true capacity (or capability, really) is that so many operations don’t account (either in their estimates — which sort-of makes sense — or in their capture of time-spent — which is unforgivable) for the time to correct defects, time to perform rework, time for paying-down technical debt, or time and effort to tracking-down the causes of defects and rework to avoid defects, rework, and technical debt in the first place!

I’ll end with one of the toughest, most sensitive observations of the last few months. Some of my best clients (from the perspective of having their act together) have strong confidence in functional competence and, admittedly, weaker confidence in their programmatic credibility. And, to put it plainly, by “programmatic” I mean their ability to have the same confidence in the rationale for their estimates and plans as they have in their ability to produce what their clients want.

In these operations, I’ve found fundamental disconnects between how work is estimated and why clients should trust the technical competence of the operation. In other words, they build trust with their prospects and clients on their ability to do the work and build the products, but in order to get the work in the first place they have to use a lot of hand-waving and breath-holding when it comes to their estimates.

A more-or-less summary way to describe all of this is as follows:

Most operations have Built a way of working that they’ve managed to Capitalize. Over time, they’ve found that their Build*Capitalize approach is tough to Sustain. Try that they might, whether it’s CMMI or something else, they’re looking to “fix” the equation on the “Sustain” side. The problem is that CMMI *does* operate on the Sustain side, but the problems with the operation aren’t in the “Sustain”, it’s that their approach to Capitalizing on what they Built is no longer Sustainable. What needs to change is on the Build side. Occasionally, there’s a need to revisit the Capitalize component, but most often it’s the Build that needs refactoring.

Hence, applying CMMI to an operation whose “build” is broken is putting the cart before the horse. While it’s possible to build CMMI practices into the operation’s way of working, this is an activity of the “build” side of the equation, the sort I noted above contrasting from applying CMMI to the sustain side. If CMMI is to be truly about improving the processes of the operation in a “sustaining” sort of way, and not defining them, the operation must understand what’s going on, and that means it must know its capacity. Because unless it knows its capacity, it doesn’t really know what’s going on.

This is probably the most important blog entry I’ve ever posted.

The video is the longest video I’ve ever posted on the blog, and for that reason, I’ll keep the text content to a minimum. 

Here’s why you should watch the video:  CMMI may be entirely wrong for you, and you may not know it!

The video explains an epically crucial reality about CMMI that many agile (and other) teams are not aware of, leading them unknowingly down a path of self-defeat and damage.  All of which could be avoided with this one super-critical piece of knowledge.

You’ll thank me later.

Backstory:

The lure of seemingly limitless opportunities can be quite strong, obviously.  And, especially in tough economic times, succumbing to that lure can cause even the best of businesses to act unwisely.  Such is the lure of CMMI ratings.

Well, anything that’s very alluring can cause unwise behavior, I suppose.  Whether it’s as apparently harmless as indulging in a luscious dessert, spending money on unnecessary luxuries, or any of equally limitless opportunities to make bad choices, doing what we want instead of doing what’s right shows up even when working with CMMI.

This blog is full of examples of such bad CMMI choices, but there’s one bad choice I haven’t mentioned much about.  That’s the choice to even try to use CMMI.

When working with a knowledgeable, concerned, trustworthy CMMI consultant, an organization should be steered away from CMMI when their circumstance doesn’t align well with model-based improvement using CMMI.  In some cases, it may be a matter of steering towards the right CMMI constellation (e.g., for Development, or, for Services).  However, just as whether or not CMMI is right for an organization ought to be discovered before too much energy is put into it, so should the decision about a particular maturity level within the constellation.

No CMMI constellation should be attempted if/when the organization doesn’t control the work that it does.  Namely, that the work it does is controlled by another organization, such as a customer.  Or, put the other way, CMMI should only be used if/when the processes used by the people doing the work are controlled by the same organization using CMMI to improve them.

At Maturity Level 2 (ML2), almost any type of work can use the practices in that level to improve its performance and to demonstrate that the practices are in place.  However, at Maturity Level 3 (ML3), you have to be doing the type of work in the particular constellation in order to be able to use the practices in it.  If you’re not doing that type of work, the practices will be irrelevant.  Attempting to use the practices when there’s no such work being done will only cause the practices to get in the way and add nothing but frustration.

In particular, if you’re not doing work that involves structured engineering analysis, CMMI for Development at ML3 will be truly unwieldy.

Adding practices for work you’re not doing is an example of the bad behavior many organization exhibit when they’re chasing a level rating rather than hot on the trail of performance improvements.  It’s these sorts of behaviors that are somehow rationalized as being beneficial when, in fact, they are unequivocally, diametrically, and everything but beneficial.  They are a colossal waste of time and money and detrimental to morale and productivity.

You really need carve out about 11 minutes to watch the video.

Over the past weeks I’ve come in touch with several companies with the same exact challenge.  Though, to be sure, it’s nothing new.  I encounter this challenge several times each year.  Perhaps, even following Pareto’s principle, 80% (or more) of the companies coming to me for improved processes have a variant of a form of distress that accounts for no more than 20% (or less) of the possible modes of distress.

In particular, the challenges are variants of a very basic problem: they want things to change but don’t have an objective performance capability to aspire towards.  Put another way, they can’t articulate what it is that their operation cannot currently accomplish that they’d like their operation to be able to do once the changes are put in place.

I’ve mentioned “SMART” objectives before.  Here’s another application of those same objectives, only now, they show up at a higher level within the organization. 

Choose the right objectives.

Executives of the organization often confuse “SMART” objectives with “fuzzy” objectives.  By “fuzzy” I mean objectives that appear to be “SMART” but aren’t, and, the fuzziness obscures the situation so as to over-render the truly uninspiring nature of the objectives as being substantial accomplishments.  In fact, fuzzy objectives are not actually objective (lacking a solid way to measure accomplishment), or, are easily “gamed” (data or circumstances can be manipulated), or, are very deep within their comfort zone – or the opposite – are ridiculously unreachable (achievement is too easily attained or excused for not attaining), or, are indicators of task completion rather than indicators of actual outcome changes (don’t actually achieve anything but give the appearance of making progress), or, aren’t tied to actual increased capabilities/performance (don’t cause anything to change that anyone cares about), or, are dubious achievements that can be accomplished by simply “rowing faster” (working harder by working longer hours or assuming too much risk or technical/managerial debt), and so on. 

These same “fuzzy” objectives are frequently couched in deceptively goal-esque achievements such as achieving a CMMI rating, or “getting more agile”, or getting ISO 9000 registered.  What I noticed among the recent crop of companies with these issues is that they shared a particular set of attributes.  They were after “improvements” but didn’t know what they wanted these “improvements” to enable them to do in the future that their current operation was preventing them from accomplishing.  Sure, as in the case of CMMI, achieving the “objective” of a rating would enable the company to bid on work they currently can’t bid on, but that’s a problem addressed in two separate posts (here and here) from a while ago.

Digging a little further, I uncovered a more deeply-seated challenge for these same companies.  In each case, they could not articulate what they actually wanted to be when they “grow up”.  Closely related to not being able to explain how they wanted to be able to perform that their current operation precluded them from performing, they also couldn’t say whether they wanted their company to be leaders in:

• product innovation,
• operational excellence, or
• customer intimacy.

According to Michael Treacy and Fred Wiersema, in The Discipline of Market Leaders, every company must decide the ordering of the above three values and how to organize and run the company to pursue the value they’ve chosen as first, followed by the second, etc.  Furthermore, and most seriously, leaders in the companies I visited were having serious issues.  Sometimes in more than one area: delivery, quality, scaling, proposal wins, proposal volume, cost pressure, and so on.  In none of the distressed companies were they looking at the performance capabilities of their operation.  And, in none of the companies did they have metrics that gave them insight into the performance of their operation or helped them make decisions about what to change or how.  In other words, they weren’t connecting their challenges to their lack of performance to the role their operational system of processes plays in that performance.

One thing that could help these companies climb out of the mud they’re in would be to simply and clearly define how it is they’d like to be able to perform that their current operations don’t facilitate, and, to define this capability in terms that represent an actual shift in how the operation functions.  Changes for improved performance is not about adding more work, adding more bureaucracy, or making people work harder.  Often, “working smarter” is easy to say but lacks substance.  “Working smarter” actually shows up as changes in the operational and managerial systems that carry out the performance of the operation.  A company that wants to perform better doesn’t need to add more work, or crack the whip louder, it needs to change how its operation runs.

More about this is in my upcoming book, High Performance Operations, available now for pre-order and due out at the start of October 2011 or earlier.